The moment I fell in love with Ireland …

was not the days I travelled along the beautiful westcoast (though undoubtetly those encounters played their part as well) but Sunday at about 9 o’clock in the evening. Sitting in a Pub in Celbridge after a day of visiting some of the most mythical places in Ireland, the Hill of Tara (the place of the High Kings) and the Bru na Broinne (the navel of the earth where the two worlds meet), with  my third Guiness (being sponsored by Sam, a local and former Truckdriver) , a local guy playing live music – and of course the TV running showing one football match or the other.
The country itself is a magical place, from the wild untamed beauty of Malin head to the eery magic of the Hill of Tara and the neolithic tombs – how could I ever envy the fellowship in LOR to pass monuments of cultures long lost and forgotten, who and what they were sunk into the darkness of times long gone – what a very Heideggerian thought … but this is the fascinating side of the country; the one that keeps you in awe and makes you understand not with your mind but by experience the tremendum et fascinosum of being and time in its fragility. It is this kind of experience that actualizes the thaumzein once again – breaking through the structures of every day reality by making us to sense  Brù – the other world. 

Now, having Arendt’s critique of this basically in my ear – maybe a better way of putting it would be that it is those experiences that shatter what we normaly think of as the real word by revealing the reality of “Sein” and “Dasein” in its beauty and fragility which we normaly try to cover up with our every day life – and yes I know that this is just Heidegger speaking again. But then his mountain-experiences might just hint at the same feeling …

So I guess for falling in love we need some familiarity to bridge this distance envoked. So while the former makes you feel your own fragility and look into yoru future were you will perish and thus give you the feeling of not being at home in the world but living an unhoused existence its this feeling of being at home that we we associate with warmth and falling in love.

So there is something about a culture where the Pubs start to fill up at about 10 o’clock at night not only with the young and cool or the ones that have nowhere else to go but with everybody. It seems like a part of the culture to mix and thus embrace the differences - the older conservative ones chatting with the young and cool ones – instead of making them demarcations. What a better way to bridge our diversity instead of trying to anihilate it. Ok, maybe this is also the 4th guiness speaking there, but still a nice thought, no?

“Swallow your ego sometimes. It’s non fattening”: On egos, marks and what they mean

So the mark is exactly like expected. Funny how I can say that and still be super disappointed It’s all over again the same procedure as it was with my A-levels, the final marks on my studies and now the PhD. At least I improved :p I guess I have to admit to myself that the old excuse that I would have been better if I have had more time is used up by now …

Now I can reflect upon myself  why that is: pur egocentrism, the thirst to prove myself and fail – or that a mark like that is the final confrontation with what we can and can’t do and brings us face to face with our real self. But then again – how real is a mark or the judgment of others? Why does formality become suddenly that important when on the other side I have always disregarded it? I get the feeling that reactions like that are still more about having instead of being – but isn’t the last one what we should be aiming at? I wonder if that bothers me most of all – not a notion of a free and independent character that

But so well – the criticisms were very well deserved – so it’s time to head on – what would be better than a nice adventurous travel to set my priorities straight again – and finally start standing behind my decisions with all their consequences which also means to get rid of the (very german) perfectionism … I guess only then one can truly affirm “Here I am”

By the end of the day my whole reactions reminds me of me being a child: even then falling down with my skis or falling off the sledge made me so ashamed of may failure that I started crying or hid in the forest afterwards Does that mean that there is some truth in there after all that people just don’t change?

The german day of fate

1918 – Germany being proclaimed a republic

1923 – Hitler-Putsch is put down

1938 – “Reichsprogromnacht”

1989 – Fall of the Berlin Wall 

and now  it’s supsie’s as well – today is also the deadline the examiners have for finishing their report on my thesis.  :-~ Thank God we enlightened philosophers are not superstitious

So what else is there to do but burying myself  as deep down in work  as possible here in my temporal home in Maynooth. I take a a page out of Arendt’s book – thinking as a distraction from the real world. But then – how real is a mark for a PhD?

Reading Ricoeur I came up with a very interesting remark: The question is not so much about “Who are you”? (The answer can just be “me”, “Susi” - or a thousand different things – I guess that’s why  I always found all the answers unsatisfying because coming up with endless possibilities also means having none to count on) but rather “Where are you?” because the answer “Here I am!” affirms ones own standpoint much more than anything else. Nothing vague about it, no talking around – it’s as pure a statement and affirmation of ones own existence as one can get. Wouldn’t that also solve Kierkegaards riddle of standing at the crossroad and choosing where to go? (There is no affirmation of a standpoint in just being unable to decide for being afraid of loosing one’s freedom with the decision)

And if you have the feeling that you can’t say it then that’s where you should start reflecting  – I have the feeling that’s where we can trace back many problems and much sorrow of our minds – not being able to affirm our standpoint in existence – or is that just me?

Anyway – regarding me – right now I just don’t know …

Discovering the irish soul

The exact title should be discovering the male irish soul though because where else would one start to look if not – in an Irish pub when the match against Italy – played in Dublin – is on on a Saturday.

After finishing some last minute work on Scheler and his idea of war (I am actually going to give a talk in Chicago on that – yippieh!!!!!) and going to the train station I couldn’t help but being infected by loads of people – mostly young men but all ages really – wearing green and waiting for the train to Dublin to get to the stadium. Funny thing this empathy …  So I am sitting there, an actual and living proof of Arendt’s theory that just as thinking withdrawals from the world and thus interupts  the active life so it is the other way around – so I sit there all smiles and no room for even a tiny thought of Scheler at all anymore – just a slight pang of regret that I forgot my camera   And suddenly one can’t help but being all for the irish team

Anyway, those Irish – a certain disregard for the rules seems to be very common, going hand in hand with a dislike for authorities. So me as a German of course being used to a certain – well at least acknowledgement – for the rules, i.e. people (like myself) at least knowing that the rule is there, I mistook the rather willingly act of people moving their cars with which they blocked my cycle lane (something that you come across constantly, so absolutly no use to fuss)  as an acknowledgement of the rules. That would have been the german reason for doing so – realizing that I am doing something wrong. And it took me quite a while to realize that people didn’t think this way – because they didn’t even know that the lane was there. So they moved their cars just put of this certain kind of politeness which stems from paying attention to the other person. Individualistic AND collaborative at the same time – what’s more likable then that

touching the void in between

Well for the last three weeks since I am here in Ireland , starting a temporary new life, I was trying to write about Ireland … the lush greens, the beautiful light when the sun is shining and the soft rain about which Boell wrote in his “Irish Diaries” that you just can’t call it bad weather – it just belongs here. The country seems to have a shire-esque feeling about it (yes there is the Lord of the rings-fan speaking again) …

But somehow I can’t.  It’s like finishing the thesis has not left me me utterly disburdened (as I thought it would) but rather speechless … like I am all questions and no answers with not even a direction in which I could turn my question. Very interesting, can’t remember having that before :-) 

I found that one of my former colleagues now referres to himself as a philosopher. Curiously enough I myself don’t feel comfortable doing that – like it doesn’t fit me. A traveller? Absolutly – but only because it accounts in so many ways.

Funny that during those last times instead of thinking what I want to do next (wasn’t teaching, philosophizing, reseaching, going to international conferences what I always wanted?) I found myself thinking a lot about my past, the decisions I made – wondering what they were all worth – and most of all about the people I shared my life with … so these words of Goethe keep coming back lately quite often

      Ihr naht euch wieder, schwankende Gestalten,

      Die früh sich einst dem trüben Blick gezeigt.

      Versuch ich wohl, euch diesmal festzuhalten?

      Fühl ich mein Herz noch jenem Wahn geneigt?

      Ihr drängt euch zu! nun gut, so mögt ihr walten,

      Wie ihr aus Dunst und Nebel um mich steigt;

      Mein Busen fühlt sich jugendlich erschüttert

      Vom Zauberhauch, der euren Zug umwittert.

 

      Ihr bringt mit euch die Bilder froher Tage,

      Und manche liebe Schatten steigen auf;

      Gleich einer alten, halbverklungnen Sage

      Kommt erste Lieb und Freundschaft mit herauf;

      Der Schmerz wird neu, es wiederholt die Klage

 

      Des Lebens labyrinthisch irren Lauf,

      Und nennt die Guten, die, um schöne Stunden

      Vom Glück getäuscht, vor mir hinweggeschwunden.

 

      Sie hören nicht die folgenden Gesänge,

      Die Seelen, denen ich die ersten sang;

      Zerstoben ist das freundliche Gedränge,

      Verklungen, ach! der erste Widerklang.

      Mein Lied ertönt der unbekannten Menge,

      Ihr Beifall selbst macht meinem Herzen bang,

      Und was sich sonst an meinem Lied erfreuet,

      Wenn es noch lebt, irrt in der Welt zerstreuet.

 

      Und mich ergreift ein längst entwöhntes Sehnen

      Nach jenem stillen, ernsten Geisterreich,

      Es schwebet nun in unbestimmten Tönen

      Mein lispelnd Lied, der Äolsharfe gleich,

      Ein Schauer faßt mich, Träne folgt den Tränen,

      Das strenge Herz, es fühlt sich mild und weich;

      Was ich besitze, seh ich wie im Weiten,

      Und was verschwand, wird mir zu Wirklichkeiten.

 

Just that Goethe was so much older writing it

War as katharsis? – Schelers phenomenological analysis in the mirror of Weil’s interpretation of the Iliad (Abstract)

It seems to be the case that certain phenomena are carrying the potency to shake existing structures or at least make them permeable. Beauty, love and force are three of them. It applies for all of them that myth and legends try to “tame” them via ritualization, symbolization and sacralization. The focus of the following considerations shall lie on the last in its canalized form as a mass phenomenon: the war. While traditionally the phenomenon of war and its causes were mostly looked upon by political and historical sciences or political philosophy these seemed not to be able to grasp the nature of the phenomenon as a whole itself. One of the few essays actually dealing with this subject from the philosophical-phenomenological point of view can be found in the works of the German philosopher and phenomenologist Max Scheler (1874-1928). In his essay “Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg” (“The genius of war and the German war”), dating back to the year 1915, Scheler tries to fathom the nature of war as cultural critical, meaning war being able to uncover the true structures of reality that have been covered by static perceptions as they are common in stable social systems and systems of thought. Though it seems quite unlikely at first glance, Scheler’s understanding of war functioning as katharsis does actually go hand in hand with the ordo amoris and man being an ens amans, two of his philosophical key ideas, the latter two including that the intentional and at the same time resigning act of love gives the things space to appear and become what they are. This making space is something Scheler believes to sense within the destructive potential of war as well: So both, love and force, aim to direct men’s attention back to the true structures of reality. For the latter – canalized in war – it would come from men being confronted with death in such a way that only by realizing death as an aspect that is inherent of life one can truly become aware of the nature of vitality. It is this confrontation with ones own mortality that for Scheler enables the individual to overcome its separation and leads him back into the human community. The major flaw of this argument can be found within two key points: Since Scheler is arguing that even when the subject dies in battle his being as person remains untouched, he displays a very unusual strict separation between the person and its life as a subject that hints at an oblivion of the body not found in his other works. Secondly he seems to assume that meaning itself (as the condition of the possibility) remains untouched by the destructiveness of war. Looking at reality, however, that does not seem to be the case. So Weil states in her essay “The Iliad or the poem of force” very clearly that this all-embracing destructiveness of war also destroys and deconstructs all meaning and “good” intentions themselves. So it is actually not the “true reality” that war reveals but only a different side which (as a new interpretation) moves between the experiencing subject and the original reality not touched by war. Instead of removing the separations between the individuals, new separations arise that are even stronger because they are not between different persons but different units and thus cannot be crossed by acts of compassion or empathy. By taking these considerations and their consequences into account, the “blind spots” of many theories come into view, being a consequence of concepts being solely based on causality and thus not able to understand certain aspects of war’s nature, its causes and its destructive momentum.

(copyright only by the author)

Ferdsch!!!!!

 

Done!!!!!! – whatever some critics might say

So this is the post I have been waiting for to write for the last … years

Done so on august 25th, 14:40

The principle of relationality: Nikolaus Cusanus’ ontological model of cognition as an epistemological foundation for interreligious dialogue

Introduction to the problem:

Whenever different cultures and religions meet, the question arises of how to deal with the stranger as the non-self, who at first gets experienced as resistance – and often also as a threat – against my own self. In order to avoid for the men who aspire a consistency of sense, that this – often forced – dealing with alterity does not to lead to an identity crisis, but rather a positive process, it requires a rational ascertainable inclusion of other and his beliefs in ones own life plan.

A promising approach for dealing with such intra-and interreligious tensions can be found in the thinking of the German cardinal Nikolaus of Kues (1401-1464) who shows in his  relational-ontological model of cognition – using the principle of concordance – how diversity can function as a sustaining element of a fertile (interreligious) dialogue.
Short placement in the historical context:

It is thanks to the historical situation of his time that Cusanus had to face the challenge of plurality. The ideal of untity, which dominated the Middle Ages, was in question: at state level slowly the formation of nation states started to take place. But also within itself, the unity of Christianity was being challenged: Western Christianity stood on one hand between conciliarism and papacy. On the other hand there was still the tense relationship to the Eastern Church. While the former was decided in favor of the, the union with the Byzantine church on the other side was only achieved on the paper papacy (in which case Cusanus had made a significant contribution) and lapsed with the fall of Constantinople in the year 1453. This political event leads to the final great challenge at that time:  both theoretically – concerning religious beliefs – as well as on a military level Islam rose up as a direct threat to Christianity.
Cusanus – particularly shaken by the fall of Constantinople – was looking for philosophical and theological arguments to develop a base for a peaceful dialogue of religions without robbing each of the religions of their uniqueness. The result is widely known: his writing De pace fidei – written shortly after the fall of the Byzantine empire – is still regarded as groundbreaking, and its slogan “una religio in rituum varietate” is up to this day a symbol for a successful interreligious discourse.
Thesis of the lecture:

But the thesis of my following lecture shall not be about this dialogue but shall regard the following: It will be argued that a more accurate and more stable basis for a fruitful interreligious discourse can be based on the cusanic model of cognition, which itself is based on an ontology of relations in which the cardinal exceeds the predominant scholastic ontology of substance that goes back to Aristotle.
Starting point: the structure of the divine being:

Cusanus finds the basis for his approach in the trinitarian structure which he develops in his theological reflections: The essence of God who is threefold can be summarized as follows: It is composed of the unity (god-father), equality (Christ the Son) and the connection (the Holy Spirit) – one already sees that trying to capture the divine essence completely by the means of language, must fail. But the reflections upon the relationship between identity, difference and their relations are crucial for the following considerations. Cusanus tries to grasp it again in the notion of the non-other, the non-aliud. In this relational nature of the referral of the Other to the non-other the relation reveals itself to be an image of the Absolute.
Transfer to the ontology:

As a first step the Cardinal now transfers this structure to ontology. The exact determination of the ontological level is crucial for two reasons: First, it is not only the place of human existence, but also the space in which religion takes place. But  – and that is just as important – the ontological structures are also the targets which must be followed by any attempt to achieve knowledge, if it does not want to miss its owns intentions which are to gain knowledge of reality and truth.

By rooting the world – which is characterized by difference and plurality -  in a previous entity – God -, he gives it  both its legitimacy as well as value. Thus he can avoid the neoplatonic view on diversity as negative and contrary to the divine unity: hereafter world can be seen as the created or finite infinity, the infinitas finita which descends from the infinitas infinita; it is also called the universe and is the location of all beings which can show themselves within the world only through otherness and demarcation. Now, however, non-idem and idem can only be determined if they are in some way related to each other. Thus the first fundamental relation is an ontological one, meaning that the things stand to each other in an infinite number of relations of being. World – as an expression of infinite multiplicity created by God – thus turns out to be a multifunctional pattern of relations.

This relation of being is in turn the prerequisite for ensuring that human beings as beings within the world and subjects trying to gain knowledge can recognize world and reality of life in their Truth (which means their true reality and existence). Also as a result of their participation in the otherness non-self and self are bound together in a relationship of similarity, making it possible to draw conclusions about a certain object by watching and gaining knowledge about another object. Since thus everything can be traced back to one origin, it becomes possible by using this principle of similarity to converge to the essence of the thing itself via rational cognition processes. As a result, we take in the world as an infinity of Relations, which suggests that all knowledge can always only be imprecise: veritas impraecisa. One always finds himself within the world of the aliud, never in the idem, for the latter would be the world of the precise and therefore can only be reached within the uncreated infinity: Only here are the things in acutaliter all that they can be precisely in their true and constitutive condition.

Again, the considerations of Cusanus of the worldly existence have to be looked upon by taking the horizon of Christian targets into view, because all Beings owe their reality to the creator. Only then can also Cusanus’ statements concerning his speculation of infintiy make sense: because things are created by God (and thus real and true) the thesis of the coincidentia oppositorum gains its meaning: the opposites must face themselves as true opposites for their full meaning to unfold. If we now think these arguments together with the other consequence of his considerations on infinity, which place the center of an infinite circle at any given point, it means – transferring it to the universe as a maximum contractum – that as a result of the immanence of the Infinite Being in every finite being that every finite being is at the same time the center of the universe, which also means that everything – not just human beings – are opened up to the Infinite. In this opening each being strives to achieve its own perfection, because nothing in the world has exhausted all its possibilities and is completely brought to reality. Rather, it is a constant flow, a conversion of potency and act. Thus Cusanus gains an absolute value for each individual: “Every being is infinitely valuable in itself, simply because it is.” In other words: Each creature actualiter expresses the reality of its own potency, meaning the active force, which manifests itself in it. Each Other, even each contradiction acts multifunctional in this pattern of Relations and thus – since through correlativity all things are integrated by surpassing their own limits – loses its negative character.
The conclusion: A knowledge model based on an ontology of relations:

Cusanus gains an image of a basic pattern of relations as the basic definition of being, existence and knowledge: By relationality emerging as the supporting moment of (divine) reality Cusanus can show further that the searching mind can only push forward to the absolute in mediating abstraction processes. The diversity of relations remains inexhaustible.

Even for finite Cusanus can easily show that recognition of the world works only by relating the equal and the unequal to one another. Thus it can only be thought of as a kind of closing in on the actual truth: All that the dialectics of Cusanus are capable of is discovering an infinite amount of relations even in the smallest part of the universe. This means for the ratio that all its findings – gained by messuring – retain their full validity in the context of the relative.

This is true even for the Infinite, which exists in space and time as the image of the eternal infinity: the universe. But: No matter how close one gets in recognition of an object, there always remains an infinitely large distance between the measured and the measurement itself, equality understood as identity is impossible.
What does this mean for the question about God or the Absolute?

These considerations lead Cusanus now to the problem of how the discursive operating (and thus contradictions excluding) rational thinking, can tap the Divine, which hides behind the wall (as an expression of Cusanus) of the coincidentia oppositorum. Using the methods of speculative mathematics and hypothetical deduction, he shows both a antecedence of the identity before the Difference as well as how the increase in the opposite characteristics to the limits of their assets suggests their constitutive unit: The Biggest and the Smallest, or – another picture – the infinite geometric imaginary forms of circle and straight coincidide, not because they lose their identity in infintiy, but because in the perfect realization of all possibilities the differences are revoked.

The epistemological instrument for this coincidence of opposites (and thus the essence of God himself) is the reflexive cognition of the intellectus, which is detected as the root of all rational cognition and becomes the place where the finite and infinite meet within a human being: When the distinctions using ratio reaches this point, it can refer to its divine origin (in which the intellectus is rooted) and thus can at the same time overcome his own limitations. On the other hand, the intellectus, which achieves its participation of the Divine in the concrete implementation of its synthetic abilities, needs the ratio for the dialectical ascent through the rational and the use of (mathematical or linguistic) symbols.

But for Cusanus language is not simply another level (that it is also), but has its own connection to reality. One can say with Heidegger, that language “als das entbergende Wort den anfänglichen Bezug des Seins zum Menschen und damit erst den Bezug des Menschen zum Seienden innehat.“

” the revealing word carries the initial relation of Being to man, and thus the terms of the relation of men to Being .”

For the relational model of cognition the following relations are revealed: While the embodied subject of cognition is related to others Beings in a relation of being – the ontological relation  – it relates in the process of cognition in relation of cognition to the perceived object, which is not yet identical with the actual being object, but is related to that in a relation of similarity.

This being originated in the pattern of relations also makes it clear why it is not possible, to set timelessly valid standards, since these are also based within the horizon of the constantly changing relations. The standards themselves can never actually be the truth, but only have their origins in it, just as the world never is truth (in the sense of absolute reality).

That the consequence is not scepticism and we still have valid standards is based on the fact that certain relationships and situations don’t vanish ort change over time. An example would be the human being as such: So long as it exists, it also carries its values, which might (among others) manifest themselves in the human dignity.
Consequence for interreligious discourse:

This structure-ontological approach has far-reaching consequences for dealing with intra-and interreligious differences: Because the universe emerges as a complex of relations, it can also only be reflected upon by following this relational structure. Thus the confrontation with the other(s) becomes the central momentum of a dialectical operating ratio, which in all its acts of cogintion always integrates the reflection upon its own self and thus reassuring its identity. By using and binding both positions (mine and the other) in a dynamic truth finding process, they are themselves again anchored in the structure of relations of the world and at the same time constantly reassure their own anewed identity.

The ( interreligious) discourse proves to be not only a prevention strategy for the greater evil (war), but as a constitutive for heterogenic societies.

At the same time, this approach defines anew the relation of men to his rationality because it reveals an anewed confidence in one’s own reason because of the reflected and communicated position. It is only because of that that a conscious affirmation of ones own position can take place, but it also knows itself being installed and kept in a pattern of relations and thus an antecedent reality, and thus also knowing that it can never exhaust the infinite number of possible relations. With the adoption of such a reality the mind, which is operating dialectically – it becomes aware that securing its own relationality is vital to the stability-  of its own position  – even if that makes it necessary that corrective movements have to be made.

Taking a closer look into by this acceptance of relationality practiced opening to the non-self, one realizes this reveals a structure of question or inquirement in a double sense: First, it is an inquiring of others concerning me, my values, my identity, that is my beliefs are ultimately being questioned; but by turning myself questioningly to the other, it also the case that I open myself for the inquiring other and thus risk the disclosure of my own self: the act of  cognition processed in the encounter with the non-self takes me in its dialectical movement inevitably to the point where I discover the stranger within myself (Rombeaud: Je C’est un autre) – the parts that, despite all inquiries to myself, have not yet been accessible by my own reflection. Therefore one always takes a risk, to let ones own convictions – the basis of ones own lives draft – being questioned with the only consequence to direct it towards a truer position.

Such a dual structure of question guarantees in its intentionality to keep the questioning self open – especially to the unknown within itself – and binds it by questioning, in the pattern of relations of the world. At the same time it is in the impetus to the dynamic cognitive process, on which every self-knowledge and identity is based. (It would be an interesting question to ask if this dynamic momentum even before the act of cognition is revealed to be a basic principle of human life as a living principle upon which all development is based.)

The quest for positioning, as a necessary foundation for a strict life plan, is not only for the individual, but also for the community as a self-concept, which, whatever the worldview, protects of an ideological fixation of any prior assumptions and thus protects the people shielding themselves from the relationships of interacting and thus removing themselves from the pattern of a dynamic structure to rather being fixed in a static system. If the latter is the case, it would mean a rigid understanding of identity as it is in ideologies, but because of the lack of compatibility with the dynamic structures would have a highly unstable identity as a consequence.
Conclusion:
With his model of cognition Cusanus gives us an epistemological foundation and a foundation for the double structure of questioning which makes up the main structure of an interreligous dialogue that is always communicating on a rational level: the seriousness of the participation will be shown by the willingness to let my beliefs being inquired and also seriously and honestly challenging different positions myself.

By that ones own (religious) identity, which is discovered being neither fully accessible and reflected upon, will thus be secured anew – on the basis of the rational engagement with others and his convictions – within itself (immanent moment) and the pattern of relations (transcendental moment). Both moments are existentially necessary for the process of self-insurance through self-discovery. Thus the cusanic concept is revealed not to be a purely western thought and life, but reveals a fundamental momentum of constituting identities within a dynamic system.

(talk given in Palermo at the IVe Congrès européen d’études médiévales: Coexistence and Cooperation in the Middle Ages at June 24th 2009)

(copyright only by the author)

„Er aber zürnt jenen, die ihren Verstand nicht gebrauchen“ (Sure 10:100) – Tagung „Vernunft, Recht und Staat im Islam“ vom 3. bis 5. April in Tutzing

Ein friedliches Zusammenleben in persönlicher Freiheit in einer Demokratie zu fördern, das hat sich die Akademie für politische Bildung in Tutzing auf die Fahnen geschrieben. Frieden, Rationalität, persönliche Freiheit – glaubt man dem Tenor vieler Medien, dann sind gerade diese Grundvoraussetzungen moderner westlicher Demokratien mit dem Islam, der jüngsten der drei monotheistischen Religionen, unvereinbar. Aber was ist dran an den Vorwürfen einer im Herzen fundamentalistischen Religion, den Ängsten vor einer schleichenden Islamisierung mit dem Ziel eines Gottesstaates? Wie ist es wirklich bestellt um Vernunft, Recht und Staat im islamischen Selbstverständnis? Um diesen brisanten Fragen nachzugehen, Aufklärung zu leisten als den Auszug aus der selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit – eine Unmündigkeit, die durch einseitige Darstellungen der Medien, die ganz nach dem Motto handeln „good news are no news“ nach Kräften gefördert wird – hatte die Tagungsleitung hochkarätige Fachleute geladen. Den idealen Einstieg zur Verortung von Spannungsfeldern lieferte Professor Bobzin von der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg mit dem Aufspannen des geschichtlichen Horizonts. Der Lehrstuhlinhaber für Orientalische Philologie tat dies in bewährter akademischer Manier. Objektiv und problembewusst sprach er das an, worüber erstaunlicher Weise zwischen westlichen und islamischen Intellektuellen Konsens zu herrschen scheint: die seit dem 15. Jahrhundert den islamischen Kulturkreis beherrschende Stagnation, die sich im weitgehenden Stillstand philosophischen Denkens ebenso ausdrückte wie in den sich nur sehr verzögert durchsetzenden technischen Innovationen. Umso erstaunlicher scheinen solche Entwicklungen deshalb, als man im Koran eine wiederholte Hochschätzung des Wissens findet. Ömer Öszoy – Inhaber der Stiftungsprofessur für Islamische Religion an der Universität Frankfurt und Fachmann für Koranexegese – kam dann schon auf das Thema zu sprechen, was unter Theologen und Philosophen als eines Hauptprobleme für die Modernisierung und Öffnung des Islam gilt: die Diskrepanz zwischen dem als ewiges Wort Gottes geltenden Koran und einer Interpretation des Buches in seinem historischen Kontext. Öszoy zufolge ist die historisch-kritische Koranexegese eine im frühen Islam durchaus gängige Theorie, die nur durch verfestigte Traditionalismen im Lauf der Geschichte verloren gegangen sei. Allein so wünschenswert diese These ist – angesichts der Tatsache, dass die meisten Vertreter dieser Überzeugung – angefangen bei ihrem wohl prominentesten Vertreter Mohammed Arkoun – an westlichen Universitäten lehren, gibt zu denken. Auch die folgenden Vorträge des Religionswissenschaftlers und -theologen Bernhard Uhde aus Freiburg und des Juristen Mathias Rohe von der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg suchten die Vorurteile einer irrationalen, mit den Menschenrechten nicht vereinbaren Religion außer Kraft zu setzen: So legte Uhde eine Religion dar, die nicht nur mit Denkern wie Avicenna und Averroes ihr aristotelisches Erbe ernst nimmt, sondern sich auch selbst als Aufklärung gegen die anderen monotheistischen Religionen versteht. Damit aber bedürfe, so Uhde, (zumindest im Selbstverständnis) der Islam genau genommen gar keiner Aufklärung, da sie gleichsam schon hinter sich habe. Eine fragwürdige These, denn jede systemimmanente Position hat immer das Manko, die eigene Eingrenzung aus dem Blick zu verlieren. Das gilt im Übrigen auch für ein Denken, das seine eigenen rationalen Grundlagen nicht mehr zu transzendieren vermag und so zum System erstarrt – in einer erneuten selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Eine solche Erstarrung ist aber (und gerade auch von zeitgenössischen muslimischen Denkern) auch dem Islam immer wieder vorgeworfen worden. Grenzen erkennen heißt immer auch schon sie zu überschreiten sagte Hegel einmal. Womit? Natürlich nur mit der Vernunft selbst, die sich aber ihres eigenen blinden Fleckes bewusst bleibt und gerade aus dieser Fähigkeit zur ständigen Selbstüberschreitung ihre Dynamik und Größe zieht. Perfekt glückte im Anschluss Mathias Rohe der Übergang zu den weiteren Kernpunkten der Tagung: Recht und Staat vor dem Hintergrund von Scharia und Fiqh. Der studierte Jurist und Islamwissenschaftler ließ keinen Zweifel daran, dass auch in einer islamischen Fundierung ein Potential für Menschenrechte liegt. Zugleich schilderte er in einer erfrischend klaren Sprache ohne jeden Anflug von Polemik aber auch entscheidende Probleme: So leide die im Jahr 1990 veröffentlichte Kairoer Erklärung der Menschenrechte im Islam – inhaltlich an die UN-Erklärung aus dem Jahr 1948 angelehnt – darunter, unter den Vorbehalt der Scharia gestellt zu werden. Für Rohe steht fest: In der Frage der Exekutive kann es keine Kompromisse geben, sie liegt allein bei den säkularen Institutionen des liberalen Staates. Summa summarum schien die erste Quintessenz darauf hinauszulaufen, dass die bestehenden Probleme in und mit der islamischen Welt sich im Wesentlichen auf ein paar Missverständnisse beliefen; angesichts der enormen Probleme in der Empirie noch kein befriedigendes Ergebnis. Am Sonntag aber zeigten sich doch noch die Bruchlinien einer bis dato eher auf Konsens ausgerichteten Debatte. So kam mit dem Vortrag von Rabeya Müller, Mitherausgeberin des vieldiskutierten Korans für Kinder eines der Probleme ins Spiel, das immer wieder die Gemüter der breiten Gesellschaft erhitzt: Die Stellung der Frau im Islam. Obwohl nicht eigens Tagungsthema zeigen sich gerade hier symptomatisch bestimmte Problempunkte. Denn wenn die unitas intellectus wie Avicenna meint, wirklich alle Menschen eint, wenn Recht gleiches Recht für alle bedeutet, dann ist die Stellung der Frau in vielerlei Hinsicht exemplarisch. Und so verwahrte sich Frau Müller auch gegen die am Vortag von Professor Uhde getätigte Aussage, generelle Benachteiligung von Frauen in der islamisch geprägten Welt sei nicht zu erkennen, sondern eher die Ausnahme – zwei Ministerinnen in Syrien sprächen eine andere Sprache; Äußerungen, die sich angesichts von gesprengten Mädchenschulen in Afghanistan auf eher auf dünnem Eis bewegen. Müller legte nun eine andere These vor: Die Unterdrückung der Frau werde wesentlich nicht von den islamischen Grundlagen, sondern vielmehr durch die tradierten Werte einer patriarchalisch-orientalische Gesellschaft gefördert. In Anbetracht dessen, dass auch die syrischen Christen ihren Frauen keinesfalls die Freiheiten zugestehen, die im Westen (vielerorts übrigens auch erst in jüngster Zeit) so selbstverständlich geworden sind, kann dem nur zugestimmt werden. Dennoch bleibt angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Mehrzahl der Christinnen in der arabischen Welt in der Öffentlichkeit dennoch deutlich selbstbewusster und freier auftritt als ihre muslimischen Geschlechtsgenossinnen die Frage nach einem zu einseitigen Kausalzusammenhang. So sollte man sich fragen, ob Übersetzungen wie der des Theologen Adel T. Khoury vielleicht nicht nur patriarchalische Interpretationen sind, sondern eben mehrheitliche Überzeugungen wiedergeben. Wiedergeben. Ernstnehmen des anderen Dialogpartners bedeutet nämlich genau das: Wahrnehmen des Anderen in seiner Andersheit. Moderne (und auch feministische) Übersetzungen – denen man allen Erfolg wünscht – tun sich vermutlich keinen Gefallen, wenn sie diese Tatsachen nicht mit im Blick behalten. Den Abschluss der Tagung bildete der Vortrag des renommierten Islamwissenschaftlers Udo Steinbach, lange Jahre Vorsitzender des Deutschen Orient-Instituts. Er legte in klaren Analysen dar, wie politische Hintergründe für die derzeitigen Probleme verantwortlich seien und auf welche die Neuentdeckung des Islam als Ressource Antworten gefunden habe – eben auch unter Einbezug der Gewaltkomponente. Auf der anderen Seite stehe der geistigen Verarmung einer unter Despotie ächzenden arabischen Welt die Dynamik der iranischen und auch türkischen Gesellschaft gegenüber. Es liege auch mit in den Händen der westlichen Welt, dass dieser nicht zum Erliegen komme. Sprach nicht die Tatsache, dass amerikanische Panzer schützend auf Ölministerium zurollten, während zur gleichen Zeit die ersten Plünderer das Nationalmuseum verlassen, eine deutliche Sprache die Wertsetzungen in der eigenen Gesellschaft und die Achtung vor der Kultur des anderen betreffend? Sätze die zum Nachdenken anregen. Und so endete die Tagung für den aufmerksamen Zuhörer mit vielen offenen Fragen – der besten Voraussetzung für einen offenen Diskurs: Warum tun sich rationale moderne islamische Ansätze – die von Soroush im Iran bis Arkoun viel zahlreicher sind, als gemeinhin angenommen – so schwer, an Dominanz zu gewinnen? Welchen Beitrag leistet die historische Entstehung, die den Islam von Beginn an auch als weltliches Reich begriff? Und welche Konsequenzen ergeben sich für die Menschenwürde aus einer gesellschaftlichen Grundlage, die der umma (Gemeinschaft) in Bezug auf das Individuum einen derartig hohen Stellenwert zuweist? Ein fruchtbarer Dialog der Religionen und Kulturen, der dem anderen auf Augenhöhe begegnen will, bedarf immer zweier Prämissen: Konsens und Ernstnehmen von Differenzen. Vorzeitige Einigkeit wäre demzufolge ebenso ein Abbruch wie das Negieren aller Gemeinsamkeiten. Bildung bleibt der Schlüssel für Veränderung und Aufklärung. Das ist nicht nur im Sinne der Akademie, sondern auch Kants und des Korans: Habe Mut dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen – denn der Herr zürnt jenen, die ihre Vernunft nicht gebrauchen. In diesem Geist sind viele Fortsetzungen mehr als wünschenswert.

 

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Er schien ganz vernünftig, sprach mit den Leuten. Er tat alles, wie es die andern taten; es war aber eine entsetzliche Leere in ihm, er fühlte keine Angst mehr, kein Verlangen, sein Dasein war ihm eine notwendige Last. So lebte er hin …

Büchner, Lenz